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OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

TORTS: THE GUEST STATUTE AND INFANTS OF
TENDER YEARS
Welker v. Sorenson, 209 Ore. 402, 306 P.2d 737 (1957)
Plaintiff's child, twenty-nine months old, was killed when the
automobile in which the child and its mother were riding as gratuitous guests of defendant driver was involved in an accident. Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death based on ordinary negligence, but judgment was rendered for defendant in the lower court.
On appeal, HELD, since the parent impliedly accepted a ride for her
child, the latter thereby assumed the "guest" status of its mother and
recovery was barred by the Oregon Guest Statute, in the absence of a
showing of gross negligence.
At common law in most jurisdictions, a motor vehicle operator
owed his guest passenger a duty to exercise ordinary care. 2 As the
3
pressures of the modern automobile era increased, many states
adopted legislation modifying this basic rule by making motor vehicle hosts liable for injuries to their guests only when the host's
4
causal negligence or conduct was wanton, willful, gross, or reckless.
The motivation was dual: to ameliorate the unfairness resultant when
one who bestows hospitality upon another is, in case of accident and
injury, repaid for his kindness with a lawsuit;5 and to prevent collusion between defendant host and plaintiff guest at the expense of insurers. 6
Under the impetus of a long-standing policy of solicitude for the
very young, some jurisdictions have excluded infants of tender years
from the operation of the statute7 These jurisdictions apply the rule
(1955).
E.g., Galloway v. Perkins, 198 Ala. 658, 73 So. 956 (1916); Carver v. Chase, 128
Fla. 287, 174 So. 408 (1937); Greene v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931);
Munson v. Rupker, 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N.E. 169 (1925).
3See 4 BLAsHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAarICE §2313, n.14 (1946).
4E.g., FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT. §47-1021 (Burns 1952); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS §256.59 (1948); ORE. REV. STAT. §30.110 (1955).
5Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940); accord, Albrecht v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 159 Ore. 331, 80 P.2d 65 (1938).
6Accord, Kitchens v. Duffield, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.2d 906 (1948); Parker
v. Taylor, 196 Wash. 22, 81 P.2d 806 (1938).
7Green v. Jones, 319 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957); Fuller v. Thrum, 109 Ind. App.
407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941); Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950);
see Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935); Hart v. Hogan, 173
'ORE. REV. STAT. §30.110
2
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that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed and not extended beyond the evils intended to be corrected.
They conclude that the host-guest relationship depends upon invitation and acceptance; 8 that a very young child is incapable of acceptance and therefore, at least when unaccompanied by a parent, cannot be a guest.9 This incapability is analogous to the incapability of
very young children that is recognized in the areas of criminal law
and contributory negligence. 10
Although there are no Florida cases on point, the Florida Supreme
Court has often referred to Michigan opinions in the area of the
Guest Statute," and Michigan recognizes the "acceptance theory."' 2
In Brailsford v. Campbell 3 it was reasoned that since the Florida
Guest Statute excludes from its provisions's children en route to and
from school, the statute "thus, by implication, includes within its terms
all other minor children.""5 The minor guest in that case was eighteen
years old; therefore the infant-of-tender-years exclusion would not
apply to him. The exclusion of children en route to and from school
does raise an inference of intent to include school-age children when
not so en route, but it does not raise an inference of intent to include
children of tender years. The statement of the Court is far more
general than is necessary to the holding of the case, and it should not
be considered as authority for the proposition that infants of tender
years are included within the statute. Mr. Justice Thomas, in his
dissent, directly touches the point of this discussion, his language implying adherence to the acceptance theory as to guests:' 6
Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 (1933).
8For cases recognizing the acceptance theory see Miller v. Miller, 395 II. 273,
69 N.E.2d 878 (1946); Langford v. Rogers, 278 Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692 (1937);
Dor v. Village of Olmstel, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N.E.2d 11 (1938); Bailey v. Neale,
63 Ohio App. 62, 25 N.E.2d 310 (1939).
9But see Tilghman v. Rightor, 211 Ark. 229, 199 S.W.2d 943 (1947); In re
Wrights Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951); Balian v. Ogassian, 179 N.E.
232 (Mass. 1931).
lOFuller v. Thrum, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941).
"See Fishback v. Yale, 85 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1955); McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla.
334, 5 So.2d 867 (1942).
"2See Langford v. Rogers, 278 Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692 (1937).
'389 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1956).
14FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1957): "[P]rovided that nothing in this section shall apply
to school children or other students being transported to or from schools or places
of learning in this state."
'589 So.2d at 243.
1689 So.2d at 245.
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"To illustrate the position ... let us suppose that a babe in
arms, incapable of accepting an invitation to ride as a guest,
hence of consciously entering the host-guest relationship, were
killed by ordinary negligence of the driver . .. why should the
parents be prevented from recovery?" (Emphasis added.)
In passing the guest statute the Florida Legislature was "concerned with the propriety and fairness of the recovery by a free rider
.
...
17 A very young infant is incapable of being a party to an act
of impropriety, of entering into the host-guest relationship, or of
showing ingratitude. This fact, together with the Florida Court's
strong holding that the statute must be strictly construed,", operates
to preclude the infant from being a guest under the statute and
should exclude him from its operation.
A limitation is placed on the child-exclusion concept by the instant case and a recent California decision.' 9 These cases hold that a
very young child assumes the status of its accompanying parent, deeming the parent to have accepted for the child. Intimations of agreement with such a limitation appear in the decisions of most other
jurisdictions in which the general issue has been discussed,2o but
there are no other direct holdings on the point. A contrary position
is taken by some writers, 21 and is ably expressed by the dissent in the
case of In re Wright's Estate.22 In view of the fact that Florida refuses
to impute the contributory negligence of a parent to its child to
prevent recovery by the latter, 23 the status of the parent or custodian
should not be imputed to or assumed by the child so as to prevent
recovery in the automobile guest area. Particularly should this be so
when the child is suing in his own right by guardian ad litem24 as
distinguished from the wrongful death situation in the instant case.
Courts generally frown on recognizing degrees of negligence, but
"7Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 783, 198 So. 685, 687 (1940).
'sSomersett v. Linkroum, 44 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1950).
'gBuckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (1954).
20See In re Wright's Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951); Morgan v. Anderson, 149 Kan. 814 89 P.2d 866 (1939); Wendel v. Shaw, 235 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1950);
Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 (1933).
2141 IOWA L. REV. 648 (1956); 30 ORE. L. REV. 265 (1950); 33 TEXAS L. RE'.

253 (1954); 1 Wyo. L.J. 182 (1947).
22170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951).
23Burdine's, Inc. v. McConnell, 146 Fla. 512, 1 So.2d 462 (1941); Jacksonville
Elec. Co. v. Adams, 50 Fla. 429, 39 So. 183 (1905).
24But see Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (1954).
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they concede that the standard of care can be greater because of the
youthfulness of the one to whom a duty is owed. 25 If children of tenden years are refused extra consideration under guest statutes, the
result is that the requisite care owed an adult is decreased by only
one "degree" - from ordinary to slight - whereas the requisite care
owed young children is decreased by two "degrees" - from great to
slightl
The statute has the effect of making the guest assume the risk of
the ordinary negligence of the owner or operator. At a time when the
defense of assumption of risk is being mitigated in many areas, it is
difficult to believe that the legislature intended to broaden and extend
this defense so that a child legally incapable of comprehending a risk
is held to have assumed it vicariously.
DONALD M.

BOLLING

25

See PROSsER, ToRTs 140 (2d ed. 1955); 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §399 (1) at
980 (1949).
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